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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONTRACTUAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ARBITRATION AWARDS IN MISSOURI AFTER HALL STREET AND
CABLE CONNECTION

INTRODUCTION
When compared to a formal trial, there are a number of advantages to an
arbitration proceeding.1 Such advantages likely explain the rapid rise in
popularity of arbitration.2 One of the primary benefits of arbitration is the
ability of contractual parties to define the parameters of how a particular
arbitration will be conducted and to customize the dispute resolution process to
their unique situation.3 Arbitration is about parties’ freedom to opt out of the
court system in favor of a private process designed to be faster, more efficient,
and more accommodating than a trial.4 However, this freedom is not
unlimited.5 It is subject to state and federal arbitration statutes that define the
limits of the arbitration process.6 These statutory limits on parties’ contractual
freedom are intended to preserve the benefits of efficiency, finality, and
autonomy.7 For example, finality is one area that legislatures generally do not
allow parties to define by agreement.8 Typically, under state and federal
statutes, there is no true appeal from an arbitration award, and arbitrators’
decisions are final and binding unless certain limited exceptions are met.9 The
importance of preserving arbitral finality stems from the notion that parties
typically select arbitration because it is prompt, fair, and free from the delays
or formalities associated with appellate justice.10 Although federal and state
statutes generally do not provide for appeal of an arbitration award, there are

1. EDWARD BRUNET, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE’S
PERSPECTIVE 431 (4th ed. 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Brian T. Burns, Freedom, Finality, and Federal Preemption: Seeking Expanded Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards Under State Law After Hall Street, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1813,
1814 (2010).
5. Id. at 1815.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. BRUNET, supra note 1, at 433.
9. Id. at 433–34.
10. Id. at 433.
265
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limited grounds available through which parties may have an award modified
or vacated.11
Sections 10 and 11 of the federal government’s arbitration statute, the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), provide a number of grounds through which a
court can overturn or modify an award through what is referred to as “judicial
vacatur.”12 However, those grounds are very limited.13 As a result, parties have
recently been attempting to circumvent the statutory grounds for review by
including provisions in their contracts that provide for judicial review of
erroneous arbitration awards.14 This has created a tension between (1) parties’
freedom to contract and to define the parameters of arbitration as they see fit
and (2) state and federal statutory limits on judicial review designed to foster
the goals and benefits of the arbitration process.15 As we will see, this conflict
gives rise to a number of questions about the ability of parties to contract
around the statutory limits on review. States and the federal government have
recently resolved this conflict though a variety of methods: some states have
opted to allow contractual expansion of review, while other states and the
federal government have chosen to make these contractual provisions
unenforceable.16 The purpose of this Comment is to predict which side of this
controversy the state of Missouri, ultimately, will decide to align itself with.
Part I of this Comment provides the backdrop of federal arbitration
legislation, beginning with the enactment of the FAA and its purpose and
policy. Next, Part II explains some of the significant provisions of the FAA
with regard to finality and grounds for judicial vacatur. Part III traces the line
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s preemption cases and discusses the areas of law in
which the FAA preempts state arbitration law, as well as the areas where state
law can still be applied. Part IV presents the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hall
Street Associates v. Mattel, as well as the California Supreme Court case of
Cable Connection. v. DIRECTV. These two cases mark the beginning of
divergent paths that federal and state courts have taken with regard to the
contractual expansion of judicial review. Some states follow the U.S. Supreme
Court’s rationale in Hall Street, while others follow Cable Connection’s
reasoning and rely on their individual state statutes and common law. Part V

11. Id.
12. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 595 n.3 (2008) (Stevens, J,
dissenting).
13. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11 (2006). As will be discussed in Part II, infra, the FAA applies to all
arbitration agreements under the jurisdiction of Congress’s Commerce Clause Power. AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
14. Burns, supra note 4, at 1815.
15. See Rachel S. Portnoy, Embracing the Alternative: Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV,
Inc. Puts the Alternative Back into Alternative Dispute Resolution, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 991–92
(2010).
16. See Parts IV and V infra.
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provides examples of recent state court decisions on both sides of the
controversy and examine why each state has ruled in the way that it has.
Finally, Part VI analyzes Missouri’s role in this line of cases and attempts to
predict which line of reasoning (Hall Street or Cable Connection) the Supreme
Court of Missouri may choose to follow. In addition to predicting which
direction the Supreme Court of Missouri would take, this Comment also briefly
discusses which direction Missouri should take, in light of policy and practical
considerations.
I. THE HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND POLICY OF THE FAA
The first modern arbitration statute in the United States was New York’s
Arbitration Act of 1920.17 In 1922, a committee of the American Bar
Association drafted a bill patterned after the New York Arbitration Act.18 This
bill would later be enacted by Congress as the United States Arbitration Act of
1925 and would come to be referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).19
At common law, arbitration agreements were seen as attempts to oust courts of
jurisdiction.20 This gave rise to judicial hostility towards arbitration and a
refusal by courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate.21 Throughout much early
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court permitted contracting parties to
freely revoke an agreement to arbitrate at any time prior to the arbitrator’s final
ruling.22 As commerce in America began to thrive, however, the need for a
quick and relatively inexpensive alternative to trial eventually resulted in the
abandonment of hostility towards arbitration.23 The 1920 New York
Arbitration Act (the 1920 Act) was the first successful stride towards the
universal enforcement of arbitration agreements.24 By making pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate “valid and enforceable,” the 1920 Act mandated court
action to stay litigation pending the completion of arbitration.25
The FAA has carried that notion forward and has represented a strong
public policy in favor of arbitration and the freedom to contract, thereby
abolishing the common law hostility towards arbitration.26 Congress’s intent in
enacting the FAA was “to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing

17. BRUNET, supra note 1, at 449.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Burns, supra note 4, at 1817.
22. James E. Berger and Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 745, 747 (2009).
23. Id. at 748.
24. Id. at 752.
25. BRUNET, supra note 1, at 449.
26. Id. at 449–50.
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as other contracts, where they belong.’”27 The FAA was enacted pursuant to
Congress’s Commerce Clause power and has been found to have significant
preemptive force over state courts that restrict the enforceability of arbitration
clauses.28 The Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s intent to treat
arbitration agreements the same as contracts and has instructed courts to
enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.29 The Court has also
stressed the finality of arbitral awards and instructed district courts to vacate an
arbitrator’s award only under the narrow grounds enumerated in the FAA.30
II. THE TEXT OF THE FAA
The following discussion provides an overview of the significant
provisions of the FAA and how they operate. Section 2 states that a written
provision in a contract “to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”31
Section 2 is crucial to the goals of the FAA because it gives bite to Congress’s
goal of placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts
by requiring the judicial branch to enforce arbitration agreements.32 This
section also includes the “savings” clause, which appears to bootstrap state
contract defenses to suits arising under the FAA.33 The “savings” clause allows
parties to defend against performance of an arbitration agreement by utilizing
state contract law defenses, such as duress or unconscionability.34
Section 3 is an enforcement provision.35 It requires courts, “on application
of one of the parties,” to stay any suits brought in federal court if it is
determined that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate the issue.36 The stay
remains in effect “until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.”37 Section 3 of the FAA carves out one of the few
roles that courts have in the arbitration process outside of entering judgment. If
there is an agreement between the parties to arbitrate the issue, the court cannot
hear that particular issue and is required to stay the action until arbitration has

27. Burns, supra note 4, at 1817–18 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68–96, at 1 (1924)).
28. Cynthia A. Murray, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 636 (2002).
See discussion in Part III infra.
29. Id. at 636–37.
30. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586–89 (2008).
31. Section 2 is the core provision of the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
32. Berger, supra note 22, at 754; BRUNET, supra note 1, at 450.
33. BRUNET, supra note 1, at 450.
34. Burns, supra note 4, at 1820.
35. BRUNET, supra note 1, at 450.
36. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
37. Id.
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been conducted.38 Section 4, additionally, allows a court to compel arbitration
if a party refuses to arbitrate according to the agreement.39
As required by § 2, the judicial branch is responsible for confirmation and
entry of judgment on an arbitrator’s award.40 Section 9 of the FAA provides
various requirements and processes for parties to have their arbitration award
enforced by a court.41 The FAA states that “the court must grant such an order
[confirming the award] unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as
prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.”42 Thus, § 9 provides a mandate
for courts to enforce arbitrators’ awards brought for confirmation unless the
award can be vacated pursuant to §§ 10 or 11. As a result, the most important
FAA language for the purposes of finality and judicial review are §§ 10 and
11.
Section 10 provides the limited grounds on which courts have the power to
vacate arbitration awards.43 The narrow scope of review under § 10 is what
gives rise to the greater efficiency of arbitration. If courts were free to
intervene or alter arbitrators’ awards, then the advantage of a quick and
inexpensive resolution of disputes would no longer be considered a
characteristic of arbitration.44 Under § 10(a), a court may vacate an award
only:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
45
was not made.

Courts generally consider § 10(a)(1) through (3) to raise concerns about
the overall fairness and impartiality of the arbitration process itself.46 The
merits of the award tend to be disputed under § 10(a)(4) and are the most

38. Burns, supra note 4, at 1820.
39. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006); Burns, supra note 4, at 1821.
40. BRUNET, supra note 1, at 450.
41. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006); Berger, supra note 22, at 755.
42. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
43. Berger, supra note 22, at 755.
44. Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards:
Where Does the Buck Stop?, 61 DISP. RESOL. J. Nov. 2006–Oct. 2007, at 16, 18 (2006).
45. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
46. Helm, supra note 44, at 18.
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frequently cited reason for vacating an arbitration award.47 Section 10 is
generally not interpreted to allow review of arbitration awards for errors of law
or fact.48 However, parties attempting to convince a court to overturn an
arbitration award on the merits often contend that a contract provision
providing for judicial review of an arbitrator’s legal error falls within the
purview of § 10(a)(4).49 In other words, parties often argue that by committing
an error of law, the arbitrator exceeded the powers granted to them in terms of
the arbitration agreement.50
Section 11 creates grounds on which a court may modify or correct the
award (as opposed to complete vacatur).51 Section 11 allows modification or
correction when there was a material miscalculation of figures, a mistake in the
description of any person, property, or thing involved in the award, or other
procedural defects.52 Similar to § 10, the text of § 11 also does not contemplate
judicial review on the merits.53
The lack of an explicit term in the FAA for review of arbitral awards on
the merits leads to a number of important preemption issues. State law and the
FAA may not be identical in their approach or statutory language.54 Thus, it is
important to know the circumstances under which the FAA will govern,
thereby precluding review on the merits; and it is also important to know the
circumstances when state law will be in play, potentially creating a different
result. This leads into the next section of this Comment, which will discuss the
preemptive power of the FAA and the situations in which state law is
superseded by the FAA’s terms.

47. Id. at 18, 20.
48. Id. at 20.
49. Id.
50. This is precisely the argument that the Supreme Court was presented with in Hall Street
v. Mattel, prompting the Supreme Court to hold that the text of the FAA does not recognize legal
or factual error as a valid basis for vacating an award. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (“[I]t would stretch basic interpretive principles to expand the stated
grounds [for review under § 10 of the FAA] to the point of evidentiary and legal review
generally.”). A full discussion of Hall Street v. Mattel will follow in Part IV infra.
51. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2006); BRUNET, supra note 1, at 451.
52. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
53. Id.
54. Although they may not be identical in language, it is important to note that state statutory
standards for judicial review of arbitration awards often closely track the text of the FAA.
Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL., 509, 520 (2009). Most state
arbitration statutes have enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) substantially as written. Id.
at 521. The UAA, like the FAA, traces its origin to the 1920 New York Arbitration Act, which
has resulted in the striking similarity in text between the FAA and UAA-based state laws. Id.
Currently thirty-seven of fifty states have enacted some version of the UAA as their state
arbitration statute. Id.
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III. THE FAA’S PREEMPTIVE EFFECT
A number of U.S. Supreme Court cases explicitly address the statute’s
scope. The first of which is Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Company.55 In Prima Paint, the Court expanded a previous interpretation of
the language of § 2 to not only be restricted to contracts “between merchants
for the interstate shipment of goods” but also to extend to any contract
“relating to interstate commerce.”56 In so ruling, the Court introduced the idea
that would later be firmly decided in Allied-Bruce Terminix: that Congress
intended the scope of the FAA to extend to the full measure of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power.57 The effect of the Court’s holding in Prima Paint
was to make the FAA generally applicable in federal diversity cases as long as
the case involved interstate commerce.58
Although the Supreme Court in Prima Paint ruled that the FAA extended
to all federal diversity cases involving interstate commerce, it did not address
the question of the FAA’s effect on state law until Southland v. Keating, in
1984.59 State arbitration law is not always identical to the provisions of the
FAA, so constitutional preemption issues are common in this area. In
Southland, several standard franchise agreements between the franchisor and
franchisees of 7-Eleven convenience stores contained arbitration clauses
stating that:
[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the
breach hereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the
American Arbitration Association . . . and judgment upon any award rendered
60
by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.”

The franchisees attempted to file suit against Southland in California Superior
Court alleging a number of claims, including several that arose under the
California Franchise Investment Law.61 Southland answered with an
affirmative defense of a failure to arbitrate.62 The California Superior Court
granted Southland’s motion to compel arbitration of all claims except those
claims based on the Franchise Investment Law, holding that those claims were
not arbitrable.63 The California Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
Franchise Investment Law’s invalidation of arbitration agreements was a

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Id. at 401 n.7, 409.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
Burns, supra note 4, at 1826.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3 (1984).
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
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violation of the Supremacy Clause and in conflict with the terms of the FAA.64
The California Supreme Court subsequently reversed again, holding that the
Franchise Investment Law required judicial consideration of claims arising
under it and that the law did not contravene the FAA.65
Thus, the question for the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the California
Franchise Investment Law, requiring the invalidation of certain arbitration
agreements otherwise enforceable under the FAA, violated the Supremacy
Clause.66 The Court held that the FAA was applicable in state court and, thus,
that the California Franchise Investment Law was unconstitutional via the
Supremacy Clause.67 The Court primarily relied on Congress’s Commerce
Clause power and the legislative history of the FAA to come to its
conclusion.68 The Court found that the legislative history of the FAA expressed
intent to remedy two problems: the common law hostility towards arbitration
and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of
arbitration agreements.69 The second problem meant that Congress, in enacting
the FAA, must have intended to override state law constraints on the
enforcement of arbitration agreements.70 Citing Prima Paint, the Court also
rejected the notion that the FAA was strictly procedural.71 Congress’s election
to exercise the Commerce Clause power “clearly implied that the substantive
rules of the [FAA] were to apply in state as well as federal courts.”72 The Court
cautioned that the FAA must apply in state as well as federal court to foreclose
state legislative attempts to undercut arbitration agreements and to prevent the
frustration of Congressional intent to “place [. . .] arbitration agreement[s] . . .
upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] belong[].”73
After Southland, the Court decided Perry v. Thomas in 1987.74 Perry
expressly affirmed Southland’s preemption analysis in its holding that
California legislation—specifically the California Labor Code—was
preempted by the FAA.75 The California Labor Code allowed employees to
litigate to collect wages regardless of any private agreement to arbitrate.76 The
plaintiff in Perry attempted to bring a claim in court against his employer for

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Southland, 456 U.S. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 16.
Burns, supra note 4, at 1827.
Southland, 465 U.S. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
Id. at 492.
Id. at 484.
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unpaid wages, despite the existence of an arbitration agreement between the
parties.77 The Court held that the FAA preempted the Labor Code and
precluded the trial court from hearing the claim.78 The holding was grounded
in § 2 of the FAA, which was said to be “a congressional declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”79 Quoting Southland,
the Court stated that arbitration is required “unless the agreement to arbitrate is
not part of a contract evidencing interstate commerce or is revocable ‘upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”80
Thus, although Perry followed Southland’s preemption holding, it also
directed lower courts to look to state contract law when interpreting whether an
arbitration agreement was enforceable and, thus, subject to the FAA.81 Perry
makes state contract law valid in determining whether an agreement to
arbitrate has been made—and whether the FAA will be activated to preempt
judicial resolution—as long as the state law (1) deals with the validity of
contracts generally and (2) is not specifically geared towards invalidating
arbitration agreements alone.82
After Perry and Southland firmly held that the FAA preempted state
arbitration law in diversity cases, the Supreme Court was confronted with the
issue of whether the FAA still preempts state law if the arbitration agreement
itself contains a choice-of-law clause opting for the application of state
arbitration law.83 The case, Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of
Stanford, involved a construction contract with an arbitration clause stating,
“The Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is
located.”84 A dispute over compensation led Volt to make a formal demand for
arbitration, while Stanford University responded by filing an action in
California Superior Court.85 Stanford sought a stay of the arbitration pursuant
to California arbitration law, which permits a court to stay arbitration where
there is related pending litigation between a party to the arbitration agreement
and third parties not bound by it.86 The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
determined that, despite the acknowledgement of the parties that the case

77. Id. at 484–85.
78. Id. at 491.
79. Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 492 n.9.
82. Id.
83. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470
(1989).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 470–71.
86. Id. at 471.
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involved interstate commerce, which would typically result in activation of the
FAA and preemption of California law, California law nevertheless governed
the arbitration due to the parties’ contractual choice-of-law clause.87 The Court
held—with strong language that will become crucial in interpretations of later
cases—that the FAA, under these circumstances, does not prevent application
of state arbitration law, even when the state law directly conflicts with the
FAA:
[T]he FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to
do so, nor does it prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from excluding
certain claims from the scope of their arbitration agreement. It simply requires
courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other
88
contracts, in accordance with their terms.
[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such
a result would be quite inimical to the FAA’s primary purpose of ensuring that
private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.
Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are
89
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.

However, parties do not have unlimited freedom to choose state arbitration
law.90 As evidenced in Casarotto, a case decided in 1996, state law will still be
preempted if it undermines the goals and policies of the FAA, i.e., if it treats
arbitration agreements differently than other contracts.91 In 1995, in AlliedBruce Terminix v. Dobson, the Supreme Court foreclosed any remaining doubt
on whether the scope of § 2 of the FAA was meant to include the full measure
of Congress’s Commerce Clause power or a lesser subset of applicability.92
Prior to the decision in Allied-Bruce, state courts were inconsistently
applying the “evidencing a transaction involving commerce” language in § 2.93
Some state courts, including the Supreme Court of Alabama in the AlliedBruce case, interpreted § 2’s language as a requirement for the parties to have
“contemplated” a connection to interstate commerce in order for the FAA to
apply.94 Other courts had interpreted § 2 as reaching to the outer limits of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power.95 The Court resolved this inconsistency
by concluding that the latter, broader reading of § 2 was what Congress
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
1840.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 476–77.
Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (citations omitted).
Id. at 479..
Burns, supra note 4, at 1840.
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Burns, supra note 4, at
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995).
Id. at 269–70.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
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intended.96 This broad application of the FAA, laid down in Allied-Bruce,
effectively extended the reach of the FAA to nearly every arbitration
agreement that did not expressly opt for a particular state’s arbitration law
through a choice-of-law clause.
A year after the Allied-Bruce decision, the Supreme Court, in Doctor’s
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, was confronted with another question of state
law preemption.97 Casarotto involved a franchise agreement for the operation
of a Subway restaurant in Montana.98 Montana state law declared an arbitration
clause unenforceable unless notice that the contract is subject to arbitration was
typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract; thus, the
contract at issue in Casarotto did not comply with the Montana law.99 The
question for the Court was whether the Montana law applied to invalidate the
arbitration agreement; or whether the FAA preempted the Montana law,
thereby requiring enforcement of the arbitration clause despite its
noncompliance with the Montana statute.100 In holding that the FAA
preempted the Montana law, the Court elaborated on its prior holding in Perry
that § 2 allows state contract law principles to be applied to govern issues of
the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally:
[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements . . . .
Courts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state
laws applicable only to arbitration provisions . . . . Congress . . . requir[ed]
instead that such provisions be placed “upon the same footing as other
101
contracts.”

The Court’s holding in Casarotto was merely a reaffirmation of the
principle first introduced in Perry: that state contract law can be applied to
invalidate an arbitration agreement that would otherwise be valid under the
FAA; however, this is only permissible when the state law invalidates all
contracts and does not isolate arbitration agreements.102
The final case in the Supreme Court’s preemption decisions is
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton.103 Mastrobuono again dealt with a
choice-of-law provision, in the context of a New York law that allowed courts,
but not arbitrators, to award punitive damages.104 The parties in the case had a

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683–84.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 686–87.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686–87.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
Id. at 53.
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contract with arbitration and choice-of-law provisions that were separate from
one another.105 The choice-of-law clause provided for all disputes to be
governed by the laws of the State of New York.106 Since the arbitration clause
was separate from the choice-of-law provision and expressed no intent to
preclude an award of punitive damages, the Court held that the choice-of-law
provision governed the substantive aspects of the arbitration and the arbitration
clause governed the procedural aspects—per the terms of the FAA.107 Thus,
the Court’s reasoning in Mastrobuono suggests that general choice-of-law
clauses may not be sufficient if parties want state law to govern their
arbitrations; instead, they must unequivocally indicate such an intent.108
So what is the state of FAA preemption analysis after this line of cases?
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that § 2 of the FAA invokes the broadest
application of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.109 Thus, where the FAA
applies, whether in state or federal court, it will preempt state arbitration
law.110 Parties may, however, opt for an application of state law by including a
choice-of-law provision in their contracts; as long as the applicable state statute
places arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts (i.e. does
not treat them differently).111 What if there is no choice-of-law provision
opting for state law; will the FAA still preempt in state court in cases not
within the purview of the Commerce Clause? This is one area of FAA
preemption that has not been explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court and
will remain unsettled until a firm ruling is made.112 The absence of an express
holding by the Supreme Court that the FAA preempts all conflicting state law
has allowed states to employ their own state arbitration law in certain
situations, even when it clashes with the FAA.113 As will be evident in Parts IV
and V of this Comment, this significant, undecided area of FAA preemption
law is the primary source of the divergent paths taken by state courts on
contractually expanded review after Hall Street and Cable Connection.

105. Id. at 54.
106. Id. at 53.
107. Id. at 63–64.
108. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62–63.
109. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1984).
110. Allied-Bruce,513 U.S. at 272; Southland 465 U.S. at 16.
111. Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd.
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476–79 (1989).
112. Burns, supra note 4, at 1835–36.
113. See Part IV infra.
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IV. EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW: HALL STREET AND CABLE CONNECTION
Arbitration awards are intended to be final and binding on the parties
involved.114 Congress established narrow grounds for judicial review of
arbitration awards under § 10 of the FAA.115 The language of § 10 has been
interpreted to not allow review of arbitral awards for errors of law or fact.116
As a result, if the arbitral award does not violate one of the four provisions of §
10, the reviewing court is required by the FAA to confirm it.117 But as we saw
in Volt, the Supreme Court has stated:
[A]rbitration . . . [is] a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as
they may limit the issues which they will arbitrate . . . so too may they specify
118
by contract the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted.

As a result, many parties have attempted to alter the judicial review
provisions of the FAA through their arbitration agreements.119 Until the
Supreme Court decided Hall Street v. Mattel in 2008, there was a federal
circuit court split regarding whether or not this type of contractual expansion
was permissible.120 The First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits had previously
held that heightened judicial review was permissible, primarily due to the fact
that arbitration agreements should be enforced according to their terms.121 The
Ninth and Tenth Circuits had held that FAA §§ 10 and 11 were the only
permissible grounds for review, regardless of what the parties’ contract
stated.122 The Tenth Circuit’s rationale for holding to the text of the FAA was
that contractually expanded review would weaken the distinction between
arbitration and judicial proceedings.123

114. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
115. Id. § 10..
116. Helm, supra note 4, at 20.
117. Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 225,
230–31 (1997).
118. Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 479.
119. For example, clauses may attempt to allow courts to review arbitrator’s awards for errors
of law or fact, in contravention with the FAA.
120. Jeremy L. Zell, Discerning the Validity of Arbitration Agreements Containing
Heightened Judicial Review Clauses After Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 40 LOY.
U. CHI. L. J. 959, 964 (2008).
121. Id. (citing Puerto Rico Tel. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir.
2005); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001); Syncor Int’l
Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96–2261,1997 WL 452245 at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997); Gateway
Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995)).
122. Id. (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000
(9th Cir. 2003); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001).
123. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

278

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:265

To resolve the split, Hall Street framed the issue as whether “statutory
grounds for prompt vacatur and modification may be supplemented by
contract.”124 The case involved an arbitration agreement containing language
that the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon may enter judgment on
the arbitrator’s award and that the court “shall” vacate or correct the award
where the arbitrator’s conclusions of fact were not supported by substantial
evidence, or where conclusions of law were erroneous.125 A dispute
subsequently arose between the parties under the lease containing the
arbitration clause; the arbitration was held and an award was entered in favor
of Mattel.126 Hall Street appealed, seeking to have the award vacated due to
errors of law.127 Justice Souter’s majority opinion (1) held that the FAA’s
enumerated grounds in §§ 10 and 11 were the exclusive grounds for modifying
or vacating awards and (2) rejected Hall Street’s contention that expanded
review should be allowed because arbitration is a creature of contract and
parties would flee from arbitration if expanded review is not open to them.128
The Court stated that “it makes more sense to see the . . . [FAA] . . . as
substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review
needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway.”129 The controversial language of the Hall Street opinion,
however, occurs towards the end when Justice Souter states:
[W]e do not purport to say that [§§ 10 and 11] exclude more searching review
based on authority outside the statute as well. The FAA is not the only way
into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they may
contemplate enforcement under state statutory or common law . . . where
130
judicial review of different scope is arguable.

Thus, the Court explicitly ruled out the possibility that a contractual clause
expanding judicial review would be enforceable in a case arising under the
FAA.131 This particular quotation from the opinion, however, does leave open
the possibility that in cases where state arbitration law applies, through choiceof-law clauses or otherwise, state courts may properly allow expanded review
under state arbitration statutes or common law.132
The dissent in Hall Street, written by Justice Stevens, took issue with the
majority’s view of the policy served by the FAA, arguing that in light of the
124. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
125. Id. at 579.
126. Id. at 580.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 586–590.
129. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 588.
130. Id. at 590.
131. Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
905, 911–912 (2010).
132. Id. at 916–17.
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historical context and the broader purpose of the FAA, “§§ 10 and 11 are best
understood as a shield meant to protect parties from hostile courts, not a sword
with which to cut down parties’ ‘valid, irrevocable and enforceable’
agreements to arbitrate their disputes subject to judicial review for errors of
law.”133
Despite Hall Street’s holding, in 2008, the California Supreme Court in
Cable Connection v. DIRECTV held that expanded judicial review was
permitted under the California Arbitration Act (CAA).134 The court considered
whether parties should be able to contract for the right to seek judicial review
in the event of legal error committed by an arbitrator.135 The contract at issue
included a judicial review provision stating that “[t]he arbitrators shall not have
the power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may be
vacated or corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction.”136 The
initial ruling by the arbitrators was in favor of Cable Connection.137 DIRECTV
subsequently brought a motion in state court to vacate the award on several
grounds, including that the award was (1) beyond the scope of the arbitrators’
powers and (2) subject to judicial review, because it contained errors of law.138
The trial court accepted DIRECTV’s argument and vacated the award.139 The
California Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its
authority in reviewing the merits of the arbitrators’ award.140 The Court of
Appeals based its decision on two prior California cases, Crowell v. Downey
Community Hospital Foundation and Oakland Alameda County Coliseum v.
CC Partners, that held similar expanded judicial review provisions to be
unenforceable.141 In ruling that the review provision was unenforceable, the
court also held the provision to be severable from the remainder of the
arbitration award.142 DIRECTV then took its appeal to the California Supreme
Court.143
The California Supreme Court considered Hall Street’s preemptive effect
on the case but determined that Hall Street left the door open for alternate

133. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586 (Cal. 2008).
135. Id. at 1339.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1342.
138. Id.
139. Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 591.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 95 Cal.App.4th 730, 735–737 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002); Oakland Alameda Cnty. Coliseum Auth. v. CC Partners, 101 Cal.App.4th 635,
645 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)).
142. Id. at 591.
143. Id. at 591.
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routes to expanded review in state court.144 The court reasoned that if Hall
Street had been intended to impose a uniform national policy requiring judicial
review solely on the grounds of the FAA, the Hall Street majority would not
have explicitly left open the possibility of a different scope of review in state
court.145 As justification for allowing expanded review, Cable Connection
noted Hall Street’s failure to consider the policy objective of enforcing
contractual arrangements; instead, Hall Street chose to focus on whether the
FAA’s text was at odds with permitting contractual expansion of review.146
DIRECTV, as an alternative to its preemption argument, contended that if
the FAA did not apply in state court, then the Hall Street holding should be, at
a minimum, persuasive in construing the scope of review permitted under the
CAA.147 Despite nearly identical text in the judicial review provisions of the
FAA and the CAA, the Cable Connection court denied Hall Street’s persuasive
authority and held that the CAA should be construed differently to allow for
expanded review by contract.148 In so ruling, the Cable Connection court relied
on prior California case law and the legislative history of the CAA in its
finding that there was both a statutory and common law ground for expanded
review in California state court.149 With regard to the statutory ground, the
court acknowledged the parallel language in § 10(a)(4) of the FAA and Section
1286.2(a)(4) of the CAA, allowing for vacatur of an arbitration award where
an arbitrator has exceeded their power.150 Contrary to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the FAA’s text in Hall Street, the Cable Connection
court interpreted the “exceeding of powers” provision in the CAA as a
statutory source for allowing contractual expansion.151 The court reasoned that
a limiting clause (i.e. an expansive or restrictive review provision) in an
arbitration agreement defines an arbitrator’s powers, and, as a result, the merits
of an award may come within the “ambit of the statutory grounds of
review.”152 The court also grounded its holding in its prior examination of
California common law, in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé.153 The Moncharsh
opinion concluded that the California legislature, in enacting the CAA,
intended to adopt the position that “in the absence of some limiting clause in
the arbitration agreement, the merits of the award, either on questions of fact or

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 595–99.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 598–99.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 592 n.4–7.
Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 599–602.
Id. at 592 n.4–5.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id. at 599.
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of law, may not be reviewed except as provided in the statute.”154 Moncharsh
saw this language as a signal that the CAA, despite a failure to explicitly
provide for expanded review by statute, did not preclude the parties from doing
so by contract.155 Thus, Cable Connection cited Moncharsh’s interpretation of
the CAA as evidence that the statutory review provisions were meant to
operate as default rules, only restricting review if the parties fail to agree
otherwise.156
After this landmark decision in California, a number of other state courts
have similarly chosen to utilize their own state common law and statutory
history to allow for expanded review, while several others have clung to Hall
Street’s reasoning and expressed concern for the future of arbitration if
expanded review is allowed.
V. STATE COURT TREATMENT OF HALL STREET AND CABLE CONNECTION
In the wake of Cable Connection, and in the absence of a U.S. Supreme
Court holding to the contrary, it has become accepted in state courts and the
academic community that Hall Street does not preclude state courts from
enforcing expanded review clauses under state arbitration law.157 The more
common argument in recent state court proceedings by parties seeking to
invalidate expanded review clauses is not that Hall Street preempts, but instead
that Hall Street’s rationale should be persuasive in construing state arbitration
law due to the similarity in language between the FAA and the majority of
state statutes, as well as the policy concerns associated with expanded
review.158 The response of state courts to the persuasive authority argument
has been inconsistent: a number of states have chosen to interpret their statutes
in accordance with Hall Street,159 whereas a number of other states have taken
the alternate route and followed Cable Connection.160

154. Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 601 (citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé, 3 Cal.4th 1, 25
(1992)).
155. Id. at 601–02.
156. See id.
157. Berger, supra note 22, at 786–87; Burns, supra note 4, at 1873; Drahozal, supra note
131, at 926–27; Portnoy, supra note 15, at 1011.
158. See, e.g., Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 696 S.E.2d 663,
666 (Ga. 2010); Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., 320 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tenn.
2010).
159. See, e.g., Brookfield, 696 S.E.2d at 667; HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725,
736 (Me. 2011); Pugh’s Lawn, 320 S.W.3d at 261.
160. See, e.g., Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011); Raymond James Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So.3d 1161, 1170 (Ala. 2010); HH East Parcel, LLC v. Handy &
Harman, Inc., 947 A.2d 916 (Conn. 2008).
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States Following Hall Street
1.

Georgia

The Supreme Court of Georgia, in 2010, confronted the question of an
expanded review provision in Brookfield Country Club v. St. JamesBrookfield.161 The case involved a lease agreement between the parties that
contained an arbitration clause with language providing for court vacatur of the
arbitrator’s award “if the court finds it inconsistent with applicable law or not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”162 The court framed the issue
as a balancing of two countervailing policy considerations: (1) the rights of
parties to set the terms of their contract, versus (2) the principle that expanded
review would frustrate the efficient, final resolution of arbitral disputes,
thereby eliminating arbitration’s primary benefit of avoiding the cost and delay
of litigation.163
Despite a finding that Hall Street was not dispositive under Georgia state
law, the court in Brookfield nevertheless sought guidance from Hall Street’s
holding because of the similarity between the Georgia arbitration statute and
the FAA.164 After an examination of Hall Street, the court concluded that the
U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning was consistent with the statutory and
interpretive law of Georgia, and its logic would therefore be adopted.165 In
addition, it was clearly stated in the Brookfield majority opinion that Georgia
state arbitration law is “no longer governed by common law, but is wholly a
creature of statute.”166 This is directly contrary to Cable Connection, which
relied heavily on California common law in construing the CAA.167 This
choice by the Georgia Supreme Court to disregard common law is a clear
decision to follow Hall Street in its entirety, as Hall Street expressly
denounced all non-statutory bases for judicial review under the FAA.168
Ultimately, the Brookfield court also sided with Hall Street in its decision
on the countervailing policy considerations.169 The court acknowledged the
fundamental principle of freedom of contract but mirrored Hall Street’s
concern that expanded judicial review would “open[] the door to the full-bore
legal and evidentiary appeals that can ‘rende(r) informal arbitration merely a
prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process,’

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Brookfield, 696 S.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 665–66.
Id. at 666.
Id.
Brookfield, 696 S.E.2d at 667.
Cable Connection, Inc., 190 P.3d at 599–600.
Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc. 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
Brookfield, 696 S.E.2d. at 667.
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and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process.”170 This interest
and importance in preserving the finality of arbitration proceedings, even in the
face of valid, arms-length contractual provisions, is a common thread in Hall
Street and the states that have chosen to align themselves with it.171
2.

Tennessee

As in Brookfield, in 2010, the Tennessee Supreme Court also utilized Hall
Street’s logic in Pugh’s Lawn Landscape v. Jaycon Development.172 The
arbitration agreement in question contained a provision providing the
following: “[A]ny and all findings, rulings or judgments issued by the
arbitrator shall be appealable, using the same standards of review, as if the
finding, ruling or judgment in question was issued by [the trial court].”173 The
court explained that both the FAA and Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act
(TUAA) were enacted to promote the private settlement of disputes without
resort to the courts; and accordingly, the scope of review advanced by the U.S.
Supreme Court has equal application in a case under the TUAA “to the extent
that such review furthers the common goal of the acts.”174 After reviewing Hall
Street, the Tennessee Supreme Court determined that the Hall Street rationale
should apply with equal force in the case at bar.175
The justification for adhering to the logic of Hall Street was twofold. First,
the court relied on a textual argument to justify its holding.176 The court
observed that the language of the judicial review provisions in the TUAA was
substantially similar to those in the FAA and, to the extent they were different,
the TUAA was even more stringent.177 The statutory review provisions of the
TUAA direct that a court “shall” vacate an award when the enumerated
circumstances are present; whereas, the language of the FAA provides that a
court “may” vacate.178 Since the TUAA employs more restrictive language
than that of the FAA provision, the result must be that the TUAA’s text does
not allow for expanded review.179
The court’s second justification for its holding was that the General
Assembly has directed that the TUAA be “construed so as to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.”180

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
See, e.g., Brookfield, 696 S.E.2d at 667; Pugh’s Lawn, 320 S.W.3d at 257–58.
Pugh’s Lawn, 320 S.W.3d at 258–59.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Pugh’s Lawn, 320 S.W.3d at 259.
Id.
See id. at 259–60
Id. at 260.
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When looking to other states, the court observed that a majority of states at the
time had taken the view consistent with Hall Street and that only a select few
states had sided with Cable Connection.181
The tension between the countervailing policy considerations again
influenced the court’s holding in Pugh’s Lawn.182 In reaching its decision, the
court also placed emphasis on the prior Tennessee Supreme Court case of
Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co. In Arnold, the court reached the conclusion
that the TUAA was enacted with the intent of limiting the trial court’s
authority to retry arbitration decisions.183 Finality was once again the driving
force behind the court’s determination of legislative intent: “To permit a
dissatisfied party to set aside the arbitration award and to invoke the Court’s
judgment upon the merits of the cause would render arbitration merely a step
in the settlement of the dispute, instead of its final determination.”184
3.

Maine

HL 1 v. Riverwalk, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in
2011, was the most recent case interpreting a state arbitration statute to
invalidate expanded review provisions.185 Riverwalk involved a dispute over
real estate development.186 The operating agreement in force contained an
arbitration clause that allowed each party to “retain his right to appeal any
questions of law arising at the [arbitration].”187 After arbitration was conducted
and appealed up to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the issue for the court
was whether parties could contract for judicial review beyond that provided in
the Maine Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA).188 The court initially applied the
plain meaning rule to the judicial review provision of the MUAA section 5938
to determine whether the plain text of the statute was ambiguous.189 Based on
the lack of ambiguity, the court initially dismissed the need to look at
legislative intent or the statute’s history and policy to determine its meaning.190
Upon examination of the plain text of section 5938, the court observed that a
number of grounds for the vacatur of awards were present, but legal error was
not among them.191

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Pugh’s Lawn, 320 S.W.3d at 257–58.
Id.
Id.
HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725 (Me. 2011).
Id. at 728.
Id. at 729–730.
Id. at 731.
Id.
Riverwalk, 15 A.3d at 731–32.
Id. at 733–34.
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With the plain text of the MUAA lacking any explicit ground for review
based on legal error, the court then addressed whether parties could alter the
MUAA’s terms via contract.192 Noting that Hall Street had applied a textual
analysis of the statutory scheme and history of the FAA in arriving at its
conclusion on this exact question, the Riverwalk court determined that a
historical analysis of the legislative scheme was, in fact, appropriate despite the
lack of ambiguity in section 5938 of the MUAA.193
Similar to the Tennessee Supreme Court in Pugh’s Lawn, the Riverwalk
court cited the common origin of the FAA and the MUAA in New York’s
1920 Arbitration Act and the resulting textual similarity between the two.194
Even where the language is not identical, the MUAA, like the TUAA, in
Pugh’s Lawn, contains language that is even more restrictive than the text of
the FAA.195 The MUAA contains a provision that is absent from the FAA, that
even further restrains courts’ review power: “But the fact that the relief was
such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not
a ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.”196 With Hall Street’s
interpretation of the FAA as a baseline, the Riverwalk court determined that the
intent of the MUAA, if at all different from the FAA, would be even more
restrictive on the scope of judicial review.197
After examining the text of the MUAA, Riverwalk turned to a discussion
of the policy considerations.198 As expected, both parties took their respective
positions on the tension between contractual freedom and arbitral finality.199
The Riverwalk court, however, contrary to the previous two cases following
Hall Street, dismissed the policy arguments altogether and returned to the text
for its decision.200 The court characterized the policy concerns over the future
of arbitration as “speculative;” stating instead that the text of the MUAA
reflects only one policy: the policy of adhering to the narrow role that the
statutory text carves out for courts.201 It would thus be violative of that policy
to allow parties to craft a contra-statutory role for courts through contract.202

192. Id. at 734.
193. Id. at 733.
194. Id. at 733.
195. Riverwalk, 15 A.3d at 733–34; Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., 320
S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tenn. 2010).
196. Riverwalk, 15 A.3d at 734.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 735–36.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Riverwalk, 15 A.3d at 734.
202. Id.
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States Following Cable Connection
1.

Connecticut

In 2010, the Superior Court of Connecticut decided East Greyrock v. OBC
Associates.203 The case was a civil action that pleaded damages for
environmental contamination of real property.204 The parties to the case
eventually submitted to voluntary arbitration and signed an agreement to
arbitrate that contained a clause allowing for either party to appeal the
arbitrator’s award and seek full judicial review of questions of law.205 After the
arbitration was concluded, the defendants initiated an appeal to the governing
trial court seeking de novo review of several issues of law.206
The Superior Court of Connecticut, in considering the appeal, conceded
that no judicial review is permissible on questions of law or fact when the
parties to the arbitration agreement do not contractually alter the authority of
the arbitrator; and in such cases, the arbitrator’s award will be final and
binding.207 However, the court took a different approach to the permissible
scope of judicial review when the parties’ agreement does opt to limit or
expand the arbitrator’s power.208 In footnote nine, the East Greyrock court
determined that contractually expanded review was permitted due to Cable
Connection’s interpretation of Hall Street and the language of the Hall Street
majority that seemingly left the door open for such an interpretation.209 The
court in East Greyrock was further guided by HH East Parcel v. Handy &
Harman, decided in Connecticut state court two months after Hall Street, in
2008.210 HH East Parcel stated, in dictum, that parties to arbitration
agreements remain free to contract for expanded review of an arbitrator’s
finding.211 The court in East Greyrock decided to follow its own state court
precedent, and additionally the precedent set by California, instead of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling in Hall Street.212

203. East Greyrock, LLC v. OBC Associates, Inc., No. X08CV044002173S, 2010 WL
3448075 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2. 2010).
204. Id. at *1.
205. Id. at *2.
206. Id. at *3.
207. Id. at *4.
208. East Greyrock, 2010 WL 3448075 at *4.
209. Id. at *4 n.9 (citing HH East Parcel, LLC v. Handy & Harman, Inc., 947 A.2d 916
(Conn. 2008)).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Alabama

Another state electing to reject Hall Street’s reasoning in favor of Cable
Connection was the state of Alabama in Raymond James Financial Services v.
Honea.213 The defendant in the original case, Raymond James Financial
Services, appealed the lower court’s review of an arbitration award originally
decided in their favor.214 The initial suit by Honea against Raymond James
alleged abusive brokerage practices in violation of the Alabama Securities
Act.215 Upon the initiation of their business relationship, Raymond James and
Honea entered into a client agreement that contained an arbitration
provision.216 The provision included language requiring arbitrators to resolve
disputes “in accordance with applicable law,” as well as a clause that granted
both parties the right to appeal an arbitrator’s decision that awarded punitive
damages or that exceeded $100,000.217 Additionally, the arbitration provision
required a reviewing court to conduct a de novo review of the transcript and
exhibits from the arbitration hearing.218 Following the trial court’s vacatur of
the arbitration award, Raymond James contended that an application of Hall
Street was required to restrict the permitted grounds for review to those in § 10
of the FAA, thereby excluding the contractual review provision.219 Honea,
alternatively, took the position that although expanded review agreements may
not be enforceable under the FAA, they are nevertheless enforceable under
Alabama common law, which requires arbitration agreements to be enforced as
written.220
The Raymond James court determined that an application of Alabama
common law was appropriate.221 The court concluded that it must uphold the
expanded review provision because prior Alabama decisions had put strong
emphasis on the principle that “courts must rigorously enforce contracts,
including arbitration agreements, according to their terms in order to give
effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties.”222 Therefore,
despite no explicit citation to Cable Connection, the Raymond James court
reached the same conclusion based on the same policy principle.223 Raymond
James, like Cable Connection, based its holding on the judicial determination

213. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So.3d 1161 (Ala. 2010).
214. Id. at 1162.
215. Id. at 1163.
216. Id. at 1162.
217. Id. at 1163.
218. Raymond James, 55 So.3d at 1163–64.
219. Id. at 1164.
220. Id. at 1166.
221. Id. at 1169.
222. Id.
223. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So.3d 1161, 1168–69 (Ala. 2010); Cable
Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334, 1361–62 (Cal. 2008).
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that contractual freedom is more important than the quick, final resolution of
disputes submitted to arbitration.
3.

Texas

One of the most recent state courts to align itself with Cable Connection
was the Supreme Court of Texas in 2011 in Nafta Traders v. Quinn.224 Quinn
brought a sex discrimination claim against Nafta Traders (Nafta) under an
employee contract that required all disputes to be resolved by arbitration.225
The arbitration clause contained an expanded review provision that precluded
an arbitrator from committing errors of state or federal law.226 After the
arbitrator ruled in favor of Quinn in the case, Nafta appealed to the district
court requesting vacatur of the award under the review provision.227 Nafta
asserted that the arbitrator had “exceeded his power” under the contract by
issuing an erroneous award when the arbitration agreement did not allow for
errors of law.228 The district court and court of appeals rejected Nafta’s
argument, stating that “an arbitrator exceeds his power by deciding an issue the
parties did not agree to submit to him, [but] he does not exceed his power by
deciding matters incorrectly.”229
The Supreme Court of Texas subsequently reversed after considering Hall
Street and the language and intent of the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA).230
Despite the textual similarities between the FAA and the TAA, the court found
that the framework and policy of the FAA was not necessarily in accordance
with that of the TAA.231 Additionally, the Nafta court felt that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s textual analysis in Hall Street was undermined by the Court’s
failure to consider that legal error was incorporated into the statutory review
ground of an “arbitrator exceeding their powers:”232
When parties have agreed that an arbitrator should not have authority to reach
a decision based on reversible error—in other words, that an arbitrator should
have no more power than a judge—a motion to vacate for such error as
exceeding the arbitrator’s authority is firmly grounded in the text of [FAA §]
10. The Supreme Court’s reasoning that an arbitrator’s . . . legal errors are not

224. Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011).
225. Id. at 87–88.
226. Id. at 88.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 89.
229. Nafta, 339 S.W.3d at 89.
230. Id. at 91–92. The Nafta court acknowledged Hall Street’s guidance, but distanced itself
from any suggestion that Hall Street was binding: “[w]e must, of course, follow Hall Street in
applying the FAA, but in construing the TAA, we are obliged to examine Hall Street’s reasoning
and reach our own judgment.” Id.
231. Id. at 95.
232. Id. at 92.
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the kind of “egregious departures from the parties’ agreed-upon arbitration”
[that §] 10 addresses loses force when such errors directly contradict the
parties’ express agreement and deprive them of the benefit of their reasonable
233
expectations.

Stemming from the prior discussion, Nafta framed the issue as whether
parties can limit an arbitrator’s power to err.234 In reaching its conclusion, the
Nafta court consulted the framework and policy of the TAA.235 Texas courts
had repeatedly recognized the policy principle that men of full age and
competent understanding have the utmost liberty to contract, and that such free
and voluntary contracts must be honored by the state.236 The Nafta court found
Hall Street to be at odds with this policy principle and found nothing in the text
of the TAA to suggest that parties could not agree to limit the authority of an
arbitrator to that of a judge.237 As a result, the court expanded the statutory
interpretation of the “arbitrators [have] exceeded their powers” ground to
encompass contractual prohibitions of legal error.238
Justice Hecht began the Nafta majority opinion by noting that “[t]he
answer to most questions regarding arbitration ‘flow inexorably from the fact
that arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties.’”239 This
statement nicely summarizes the rationale of, not only the holding in Nafta, but
also the primary justification for Cable Connection’s divergence from Hall
Street.
VI. HOW SHOULD MISSOURI RESPOND?
The Cable Connection line of cases emphasizes the importance of freedom
of contract with regard to arbitration. Alternatively, the cases aligning
themselves with Hall Street hold to the notion that the primary and most
significant purpose of arbitration is its final, binding, and expeditious nature;
and that allowing parties to violate those essential policies of arbitration
discourages the use of arbitration, which may lead to an increased burden on
an already strained judiciary.240 These competing theories are the nuts and
bolts of the two diverging lines of cases. The Supreme Court of Missouri has
not yet ruled on the enforceability of expanded review provisions or indicated
which countervailing policy consideration they may eventually deem more
important. In this final section, the practical implications and policy arguments

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 92–93.
Nafta, 339 S.W.3d at 93.
Id. at 95–96.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id.
Nafta, 339 S.W.3d at 87.
See supra Part IV.
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of both sides of the controversy will be considered. In addition, this Comment
will also attempt to predict which side Missouri may ultimately join.
A number of legal scholars have considered the practical effects of the
enforceability of expanded review clauses. In an article written in the Dispute
Resolution Journal in 2007, prior to Hall Street and Cable Connection,
Katherine Helm cautions against the enforcement of expanded review
clauses.241 Helm justifies deviation from complete, uninhibited freedom of
contract in arbitration by citing the common law public policy exception.242
She argues that under this exception a court’s review should be highly
deferential so as not to undermine the federal statute’s explicit policy favoring
arbitration.243 Allowing expanded review would only complicate the arbitration
process.244 It would force arbitrators to issue lengthy written opinions and
would result in a large number of appeals.245 This sacrifice of the benefits of
arbitration may have the effect of discouraging parties from resorting to
arbitration altogether.246 Helm contends that whenever parties agree to
arbitrate, they are agreeing to accept whatever uncertainties might arise from
the process, thereby making a conscious choice to trade formal procedures and
judicial review for the simplicity, informality, and speed of arbitration.247
Cynthia Murray’s 2002 article takes the opposing view to that of Helm and
argues that it should be the parties’ decision whether to forego the perceived
benefits of arbitration in order to obtain expanded review.248 Citing FAA § 2
and Allied-Bruce, Murray notes that the primary purpose of the FAA,
according to its text and the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior holdings, is to place
contracts on equal footing with other contracts.249 It follows, then, that in order
for this stated purpose to be realized, parties should be able to structure
arbitration agreements according to their wishes just as they may with any
other contract.250 Murray also argues, contrary to Helm, that parties would be
more likely to shy away from arbitration if they feel they have less control over
the process.251 Although lack of finality and speed may discourage some
parties from choosing arbitration, the ability to fully control the parameters of

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Helm, supra note 44, at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Helm, supra 44, at 25.
Id. at 24.
Murray, supra note 28, at 655–56.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 656.
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the arbitration is a far more important incentive for potential parties to
arbitration agreements.252
A different theory in favor of expanded review is discussed by Rachel
Portnoy in the New England Law Review.253 Portnoy documents the initial rise
of arbitration in the 21st century and how it has become such a large business
that checks and balances are necessary to “protect arbitration from itself.”254
She cites a growing concern over arbitrator partiality as the necessity for a
mechanism to keep the arbitration process in check; and expanded judicial
review is precisely the process to fill this need.255 With expanded review
available to parties that prefer it, arbitration will be a more attractive dispute
resolution process.256 As long as parties understand that they may be
sacrificing speed, simplicity, or privacy by contracting for expanded review, it
should be their choice to determine the fate of their own legal disputes.257
With these arguments in mind, which policy consideration will Missouri
courts find more valuable? Which side will they eventually take? Finally, how
will they justify their decision under Missouri arbitration law? The Missouri
arbitration statute is, as in most states, substantially similar to the language of
the FAA.258 The grounds for judicial review in section 435.405 mirror the
textual provisions of the FAA.259 Missouri’s language is no more or less
restrictive than that of the FAA.260 While that may seem to suggest potential
conformity with Hall Street, recall that one of the primary justifications in
Pugh’s Lawn and Riverwalk for following Hall Street was that the respective
state statutes in question had additional language that was even more restrictive
than the text of the FAA.261 Similar, additional language is not present in the
Missouri statute.262 Although this is far from dispositive, and just as likely
leaves Missouri courts free to construe the Missouri statute in accordance with
the FAA due to their textual similarities; it is important to note that one of the
significant grounds for the holdings in Pugh’s Lawn and Riverwalk is absent
from the Missouri statute.

252. Id.
253. Portnoy, supra note 15, at 1009–10.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1010.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1010–11.
258. Estate of Sandefur v. Greenway, 898 S.W.2d 667, 669 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (citing Cairo v.
Bodine, 685 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Mo. App. W.D. 1985)). See also Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 435.350–470
(2000); 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Section IV supra.
262. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 435.350–470 (2000).
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Additionally, there is some evidence in Missouri common law that
contractual expansion of review is, at the very least, not precluded under the
statute.263 In Estate of Sandefur v. Greenway, a Missouri Court of Appeals case
preceding Hall Street, the court, in dicta, discussed the statutory grounds for
vacatur under Missouri law:
[T]he binding arbitration award may not be set aside by a court, even in [sic]
the court would have taken a different action. Referring back to the only
methods of vacatur, as set out in [section] 435.405 in footnote one, the failure
to follow the law as a court would have done, without agreement to do so in
the contract, does not afford relief through the courts. . . . . A disregard for the
264
law is not one of the statutory bases for vacating an award.

This statement by the court suggests that if the parties had in fact
contractually required the arbitrator to follow the law, relief may have been
possible through the courts. The court stated that legal error and manifest
disregard of the law are not statutory bases for vacatur under the “exceeding of
powers” ground, but it does not rule out the possibility that they may be
contractual bases for vacatur.265
Outside of this case, Missouri common law provides little guidance
towards which direction the state may take on the expanded review issue. It
will likely hinge on judicial discretion and the balancing of policy
considerations as it has in the states that have already considered the question.
Based strictly on the policy issues, Cable Connection’s holding is the correct
one for Missouri. Expanded judicial review by contract should be allowed in
Missouri to honor parties’ consensual determinations on how their disputes
should be resolved. Arbitration is a creature of contract; it is a voluntary
process that parties choose to enter into as an alternative to litigation. Parties
are already permitted to structure a number of features of arbitration to their
specific situation. It is well-established that parties may determine: the types of
damages that the arbitrator may award,266 what issues will be arbitrated,267 the
rules that govern the arbitration,268 whether the arbitrator must provide a

263. Sandefur, 898 S.W.2d at 670.
264. Id. (emphasis added).
265. Id.
266. Murray, supra note 28, at 647.
267. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (“[A] party can be
forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration . . . .”).
268. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008).
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written opinion,269 the qualifications and methods of selection for arbitrators,270
and also the choice of substantive law.271
There are a number of incentives and benefits to choosing arbitration, but
the most important is the flexibility that it provides. Each set of parties is, in
essence, creating their own “ideal” dispute resolution process based on their
needs and value judgments. The flexibility that expanded review allows is
precisely why it is the most effective choice. Opponents of expanded review
speculate that it may jeopardize the future of arbitration because the important
goals of finality and simplicity would be sacrificed; but they do not have to be.
Just because expanded review is permitted does not mean all parties will utilize
it. Different parties will inevitably value different aspects of arbitration more
strongly, so why not let parties structure their agreements according to their
individual value judgments. Many parties will undoubtedly still prefer
traditional review standards in order to save time and money and traditional
review will still be available to them. Allowing expanded review is not an
elimination of finality and simplicity for those that prefer it; it is merely an
authorization of alternatives for those that prefer the protection of judicial
review.
CONCLUSION
As even Hall Street concedes, the FAA is motivated “first and foremost,
by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties ha[ve]
entered.”272 Cable Connection correctly stated that the goals of finality and
informality that Hall Street so highly values draw their strength from the
contractual agreement between the parties.273 It is, accordingly, those parties
that are in the best position to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of
traditional arbitration review against the benefits of expanded review.274
In conclusion, when the Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately rules on the
issue of contractually expanded judicial review, it should follow the lead set by

269. Murray, supra note 28, at 646. The American Arbitration Association discourages
arbitrators from issuing opinions or explaining the reasons for their awards but parties may
nevertheless require them to do so by contract. Id.
270. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 586.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 585.
273. Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1361 (2008).
274. Id.
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Cable Connection. Allowing expanded review through contract will honor
parties’ intents, preserve the FAA’s stated goal of placing arbitration
agreements on equal footing with other contracts, and continue the growth of
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism by increasing its adaptability and
appeal.
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